مرحباً بكم....إنطلاق التعداد السكاني الخامس فى22 ابريل 2008

 
 

 

 

A Fourth Mission Report to the Census  Monitoring and Observation Committee (MOC) of the Sudan

 

Census questionnaires a crisis waiting to happen

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Author Pali Lehohla

Statistician-General

Statistics South Africa

Mission Period

                                                          18-27 April 2008

 

 


 

 

On the issue of questionnaires: a crisis waiting to happen

 

1.         Background

 

The political climate in the Sudan created very serious constraints as regards the latitude on the number of questionnaires that would be printed.  Under circumstances packaging and printing of questionnaires does not become an issue because of benefits of economies of scale past a threshold plus say 30% to 50% additional print runs.  The number of questionnaires printed for approximately 7 million households in Sudan, 1.4 million in the South and 5.7 million in the North are about 8.3 million.  Of these 2.2 million were distributed to the South and 6.1 million in the North.  The South has thus got about 800 000 more questionnaires than what the quick count suggested and the North have had 500 000 more questionnaires that the quick count suggested.

 

These margins, in particular for the North are very tight, given that they are barely 10% more than the quick count estimate, compared to approximately 60% of what the quick count in the South provided.

 

2.         Packaging and distribution

 

The packaging and distribution of questionnaires in the North was more efficient as it provided for firstly a hundred questionnaires to enumerators irrespective of the size of their Enumeration Areas, and assigned 800 questionnaires to the supervisor for evening out any requirements as and when they occurred.   So although the margins for the North were tight, the distribution allows for managing and providing questionnaires as and when shortages occur. 

 

In the South the packaging was for 200 questionnaires per enumerator, irrespective of the size of their EA or locality.  This implied for the South an allocation of questionnaires even where more questionnaires were not needed without a possibility of structured redistribution of questionnaires.   This approach has induced an artificial scarcity.

 

3.         Listing information

 

This information would be very useful to identify where shortages exist, however it is not readily available even in Khartoum State, with all the necessary high level resources, this information could only be forthcoming after three days of being requested but even then not for all states.  What is encouraging is that the information exists, what is disturbing is that it is prepared on forms that were not prescribed and at a later stage a form has been designed to collate the information.

 

The listing information for Khartoum for the four Local Areas thus far covered shows that the listing by enumerators has a discrepancy of up to 30% between quick count and listing.  This is to be expected particularly in Khartoum and possibly in other urban areas where each site corresponds to more than one household.  So for Khartoum and other urban centres (with Khartoum showing the highest propensity of coefficients between quick count and listing, the allocation should have been in the region of 30% or more questionnaires in Khartoum than what the quick count suggested) and possibly 20% more in other urban centres.  Based on the 450 000 surplus in the North, Khartoum will claim 300 000 of this surplus leaving all other urban areas in the North to share 100 000 questionnaires. 

 

4.         A crisis waiting to happen in two to four days

 

The crisis of shortages in the North is a crisis waiting to happen, but only postponed by the efficient distribution of questionnaires.   An additional 10% of the original allocation will be necessary for the North to avoid this crisis in the next four days.

 

In the South the crisis has begun to manifest itself as questionnaires have started to get finished and supervisors do not have excess stock.  This problem is unlikely to be resolved even though theoretically the South might have enjoyed a 60% margin to play with on questionnaires.  Ironically in the South the crisis has manifested itself much earlier despite better margins.

 

5.         What needs to be done?

 

By delivering about a million questionnaires to Sudan in the next four days, this crisis can be averted.  Six hundred thousand of these questionnaires should be provided to the North and four hundred thousand to the South.

 

6.         What of the political problem?

 

When the strategy is executed with speed it leaves very little time for creative political solutions to emerge.  Managed properly even with poor record keeping, more questionnaires would not lead to successful creativity politically.  If enumeration closes on the 6th of May as scheduled and all mo-pup areas are followed through there is very little as regards the fear for room for political creativity.

 

7.         Implications

 

There are five implications that the implementation of this solution brings along with it.  These are time, financial, communication, political and weather.

 

  • The delivery of questionnaires will delay the closure of the project by about ten days; 

  • With the extension of time by ten days the enumeration budget will double and payment for the entire chain of command is bound to double and arrangements for additional stipends should be made immediately and governance implications communicated to those in authority;

  • The extension of period needs to be communicated no later than the 30th of April to allow the forces to continue to work for extended periods;

  • The listing information as of 21st April should be collected from all supervisors long before additional questionnaires are delivered, preferably by the 30th of April and immediately subjected to scrutiny. This will mitigate the political problem.  The difficulties will have to be communicated through the political structures and they have to be assured that the census is on course and there is every extra care to ensure a transparent process; and

  • The weather in the South will continue to threaten the success of the census as the rains begin to intensify.

 

8.   Recommendation

 

This matter be taken up at the highest political level and the British High Commissioner gets the DRS to prioritise the printing of a million questionnaires with delivery start to end in the next five days.

 

9.   Conclusion

 

Many fingers can be pointed to many people, but we are in it together and political sensitivities had to be dealt with and these are their consequences.  What is important is to demonstrate that the consequences are not insurmountable and the sensitivities have continuously been taken care of. 

 

Having managed the crisis of a postponement should give us courage to manage the crisis of successfully making materials available to enumerate everybody.   This is another test we should overcome.

 

 
 

 

 

Email:info@mocsudancensus.org